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Abstract 
In this study we analyze which are the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over the interest rates in 16 
markets outside euro zone during the current international financial crises period, in a 
framework of different exchange rate regimes. We adopted in our approach a methodology derived from the one used 
by Frankel et al. (2004). We found that the sample countries do not develop an independent monetary policy in 
relation with ECB on the long run, but the results seem to confirm that there are differences on groups of countries 
(EU and non EU member) and due to heterogeneity of their exchange rate arrangements. Also, there are significant 
differences between the official declared exchange rate regimes and the real behavior of the monetary authority, 
especially those with pure floating exchange rate regimes. This could be a lesson for international banks with great 
exposure on CEE markets. The sensitivity of domestic interest rates of CEE countries to euro interest rates 
demonstrates a possible regional vulnerability. 
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1. Introduction 
In august 2007, burst one of the most severe crises known until today, with the epicenter in US 
economy. Europe has been stroked by the crises, as well. The recent turmoil on the international financial 
markets underlines the importance of contagion effect. Changes in interest rates in certain countries tend 
to have significant effects on other countries, especially on their banking systems. Under these conditions, 
some turbulence on certain monetary markets could be reflected in the evolution of interest rates on other 
countr  markets. This could be an issue for the international strategic management of banks, especially 
multinational banks, which have exposure on different international markets. Banks have to deal with 
different market risks and to manage their assets and liabilities, making interest rates arbitrage (their 
international position allow them to draw resources from markets with low interest rates and to invest 
them on markets with higher interest rates). The international financial crisis may complicate their 
mission because of contagion effect that increases risks. Many international banks from Western Europe 
have established subsidiaries and branches in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries as 
consequences of globalization and increasing competition. Banks from Austria, Greece, France or 
Germany developed significant exposures in this part of Europe, being attracted by these emerging 
markets.  
In this study we analyse which (if any) are the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over 
the interest rates in 16 CEE selected countries  money markets outside euro zone, in a framework of 
different exchange rate regimes. We estimate whether the choice of exchange rate regime affects the 
sensitivity of local interest rates to euro (international) interest rates. We adopted in our approach a 
methodology derived from the one used by Frankel et al. (2004). The importance and originality of this 
paper consist in assessing selected CEE countries outside euro zone (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Republic of Moldavia, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Serbia and Turkey) in the current international financial crises period 
(September 2007  December 2010). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the monetary independence hypothesis and interest rates transmission. In section 3 we explain the 
methodology we have used to investigate the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over the 
domestic interest rates in the selected countries and in section 4 we discuss the data. Section 5 is dedicated 
for presenting the results of the empirical analysis and discussion. In the final section, we conclude and 
make policy recommendations. 
2. Literature review 
exchange rates, domestic monetary autonomy and open capital markets all at once. The monetary 
independence hypothesis originated with Fleming (1962), Mundell (1963, 1964), and Dornbusch (1976) 
models, argues that flexible exchange rates allow countries to pursue independent monetary policies and 
the domestic interest rate should be less sensitive to changes in international interest rates  other things 
equal. By the contrast, under pegged exchange rates and unrestricted capital flows, domestic interest rates 
cannot be set independently, but rather must track closely those prevailing in the country to which the 
domestic currency is pegged. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) were among the first who emploied open 
economy macroeconomic models.  
There are many empirical regional and single country studies that research on the degree of monetary 
autonomy of central banks in the framework of capital markets liberalization and the choice of exchange 
rate regimes. Cumby and Obstfeld (1981) showed that the Mexican central bank had considerable short-
run control over domestic credit conditions under a fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s, 
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although at a cost of high reserve volatilities. Hausmann et al. (1999), studying exchange rate regimes in 
Latin America, discovered that flexible exchange rate regimes did not permit more stabilizing monetary 
policy and that pro-cyclical monetary measures were actually supported by flexible exchange rate 
regimes. Flood and Rose (1995) and Rose (1996), examining trade-offs between exchange rate volatility 
and measures of monetary divergence, found either no support or weak support for the trade-offs implied 
by the trilemma. Frankel (1998) concludes that countries having floating or intermediate regimes (i.e., 
Mexico after 1994 and Brazil before mid-1998), exhibit much higher interest rate responses than countries 
with less flexible exchange rate regimes (i.e. Argentina, Hong Kong or Panama). Borensztein et al. 
(2001), focusing on some countries with currency boards or floating regimes (such as those in Argentina, 
Mexico, Hong Kong, and Singapore), found some evidence consistent with the traditional view.  
Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010) compare international interest rate responses under pegged and non-
pegged regimes to identified, unanticipated, and exogenous U.S. interest rate changes and realized U.S. 
interest rate changes. They found important differences in estimated transmission from the two sets of 
measures - identified interest rate changes demonstrate a greater concordance with the impossible trinity 
than realized rate changes. Miniane and Rogers (2007) identify U.S. interest rate shocks from structural 
vector autoregressions (SVARs) and estimate their transmission to a range of foreign interest rates.  
Shambaugh (2004) reports evidence that a peg imposes a constraint on monetary policy in the form of 
higher interest rate pass-through. By contrast, Frankel et al. (2004) find that full interest rate pass-through 
cannot be rejected in many cases, even for non-pegs. They use different exchange rate regime 
classifications in their estimation. Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) argue that under the modern float 
there could be limited monetary autonomy. Bordo and Flandreau (2003) discovered that even under the 
classical gold standard domestic monetary autonomy was considerable. Obstfeld et. al (2004) found that 
the interest rates of pegged economies react more to changes in the base rate; the base rate can explain 
more of the changes in the local rate for pegs; also, the pegs react more quickly and have a stronger long 
run relationship to the base than non-pegs do. Their studies cover a period over more than 130 years. 
Fratzscher (2002) analyzes the trade-off between exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy autonomy 
for a group consisting of open emerging market countries and countries under the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), finding no systematic link between exchange rate flexibility and monetary 
independence. 
There are few studies that research on monetary autonomy of central banks from Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries or EU new member states. Comparative analysis including CEE countries does 
not find a clear pattern for interest rate response to external factors according to different exchange rate 
systems. Also, the samples countries were not too comprehensive.  Habib (2002) investigates the impact 
of external factors on daily exchange rates and short-term interest rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. The conclusions are that exchange rates and interest rates are not influenced by short-term 
German interest rates. However, shocks to emerging market risk premia do have an impact on exchange 
rates in these three countries. Crespo Cuaresma and Wojcik (2006) estimate using a Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation (DCC) multivariate GARCH model, the degree of time-varying correlation in interest rate 
shocks with Germany and the U.S. under different exchange rates regimes for three new EU member 
countries  Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland. They find that the dynamic behavior of the correlations 
in interest rate shocks in the Czech Republic appear to be consistent with theory, but they demonstrate no 
evidence to support the validity of the monetary hypothesis in Hungary and Poland. Scheicher (2000) 
finds that short-term interest rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are segmented at a regional 
and at a global level and do not interact with the benchmark rate in Germany during the period 1997-98. 
Darvas and Szapary (1999), including Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in a sample of emerging 
economies, consider impossible to differentiate interest rate responses to external shocks according to the 
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National Bank of Romania (NBR) after adopting a managed floating exchange rate regime on August 
2005 and find that the effect of euro interest rate changes on the local interest rate seems to be higher than 
expected. 
3. Methodology 
Our intent is to establish the extent of monetary policy independence in the selected European countries, 
members and non-members of the European Union. To highlight the empirical regularities regarding the link 
between their domestic interest rates and the euro interest rate, we estimate a simple linear model on a panel 
data series, as follows: 
 
       (1) 
 
where: 
rdi,t  domestic nominal interest rate for the local currency of country i at time t; 
ret  foreign (euro) interest rate at time t; 
Ii,t  inflation differential for country i at time t (control variable); 
fi  country i specific effect; 
i,t  error term for country i at time t. 
This equation describes the long-
parameter is our main focus and shows the sensitivity of the domestic interest rate to euro interest rate 
movements. The specification includes the inflation differential (domestic versus euro area) as a control 
variable. This is a proxy for the variation of the currency risk premium and/or country risk premium, which 
may determine the cross-country and time variation of the interest rates (Frankel et al., 2004). 
The average level of the domestic interest rate   may be determined as an average of the country-
specific effects, fi (not accounting for the euro interest rate and the control variable), as follows: 
 
       (2) 
 
There is evidence of possible heteroscedastic and serially correlated OLS residuals and, as a consequence, 
the standard estimation methods may not be employed. We use a IV cross-section fixed-effects estimation on 
the panel countries, with a Newey-West estimator, robust against heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
methodology is based on a three step empirical research. 
We estimate the specification (1) on the whole sample, on subsamples divided by exchange rate regimes 
and on subsamples selected by the EU membership status and the exchange rate regime respectively. 
The need to deepen our analysis by breaking the data in three regime subsamples is due to the various 
exchange rate arrangements adopted by the selected countries and the evidence that the country effects are 
different for each regime type. We are also interested in highlighting the particularities of the monetary 
policy transmission mecanisms in the EU member countries versus the non-members from CEE. 
For the current paper we grouped the countries in three broad regime types  fixed(pegged), intermediate 
and floating  depending on the flexibility of the regime, similarly to the Frankel et al. (2004) approach, but 
the difference is that we employed two different classification approaches, for the robustness check of the 
model de-jure exchange rate 
regimes and the de facto exchange rate policy implemented by monetary authorities. These classifications 
reflect different aspects of the exchange rate policy. As Harms and Kretschmann (2009: p. 140) 
a distinction is important since, on the one hand, many countries tolerated  and still tolerate  the existence 
of parallel foreign exchange markets, and in these countries the stability of the official exchange rate often 
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two widely used in the literature exchange rate regime classifications  the IMF de jure approach and the 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) de facto approach.  
 
Frankel et al. classification 
Pegged Intermediate Floating 
IMF classification 
(1) no separate legal tender 
(2) currency board arrangement 
(3) other conventional fixed peg 
(4) horizontal band 
(5) crawling peg 
(6) crawling band 
(7) managed floating without pre-announced path for 
exchange rates 
(8) independently floating 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification 
(1) No separate legal tender 
(2)Pre announced peg or currency 
board arrangement 
(3)Pre announced horizontal band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2% 
(4)De facto peg 
 
(5) Pre announced crawling peg 
(6) Pre announced crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2% 
(7) De factor crawling peg 
(8) De facto crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-2% 
(9) Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or 
equal to +/-2% 
(10) De facto crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-5% 
(11) Moving band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and  
depreciation over time) 
(12) Managed floating 
(13) Freely floating 
(14) Freely falling 
 
Note d 
Source: Frankel et al. (2004),  IMF and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
Figure 1. The correspondence between the exchage rate regime classifications 
 
Three main factors determine the extent of domestic and foreign interest rates close correlation 
(Frankel et al., 2004): the degree of financial integration of the domestic economy into world market, the 
degree of business cycles synchronization and the nature of shocks. Assuming a given level of these 
factors, the economic theory states that a higher degree of exchange rate flexibility should allow a higher 
degree of monetary policy independence (Hanke, 2008). The foreign shocks are absorbed especially by 
the domestic currency exchange rate as long as the flexibility of the exchange rate is higher. Thereby a 
country with a flexible exchange rate regime has a low sensitivity of the domestic interest rates to the 
euro (foreign) interest rates (and vice- peg intermediate 
float peg float <1. However the floating 
regime interest sensitivity may equal or even exceed unity in a situation when monetary authorities 
choose the same monetary policy rule as the world at large (or a region) and the countries face common 
shocks or correlated business cycles. 
This may be our case, as our panel data contains countries that are EU members heading towards EMU 
and others that have economies strongly linked to the EU, so the monetary policies may be closely 
following the European Central Bank policy. 
4. Data 
Our primary source of data is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), but we also downloaded data from the internet sites of the Albanian and 
Macedonian Central Banks. The monthly data sample period is from September 2007, the begining of the 
financial crises in Europe, to December 2010. 
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We use the IFS 60BZF monthly series of the money market rates (3 months maturity) in Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Turkey and euro area. As the 60BZF series are not available for Hungary and Montenegro, we use the 
60CZF monthly series of the 3 months - Treasury bill rate instead. The monthly data for Albania and 
Macedonia are complied from the daily series of 3-month money market rates, available on their 
respective central banks sites. 
As a control variable, we use the inflation differential calculated as a log difference of the domestic 
versus euro area consumer price index, available in the IFS database. 
All interest rates and inflation rates are expressed as continuous compounded variables  r = 100% * 
ln(1+R), where R=10% is expressed as 0.10. 
The de jure de jure classification system, introduced 
by the Fund in 1999 and available in  rrangements and 
(AREAR). The de facto exchange rate arrangements dataset (Ilzetzki, Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2010) was kindly provided to us by Carmen Reinhart. It seems that the floating exchange 
arragements are virtually missing in CEE countries in the selected period, according to the latter 
classification (only 4 observations). 
5. Results and discussion  
In our estimations, f -value from the Wald 
1. In the Table 1, we show the results for all panel data and for the regime 
subsamples. We can notice that all the estimations are significantly different from zero. The slope 
coefficient estimate for the entire sample is 0.638 and is not significantly different from unity, which 
suggests that, during current international financial crises, the panel countries do not develop an 
independent monetary policy versus the European Central Bank (ECB) on the long run. We can also 
conclude that there is an interest rate transmission from euro money market to CEE money markets, even 
, that could induce a possible contagion effect in case of financial turbulence. If we consider the 
estimation on exchange rate regime subsamples, we can observe that the conventional wisdom is not 
confirmed: the point estimate of the slope value is higher under intermediate regimes (0.683) than under 
pegged regimes (0.405), but both estimates are significantly different from unity. In the case of floating 
exchange rate regime, the point estimate of the slope value is higher, but statistically not different from 
one (1.173), suggesting a full transmision of interest rates. The results seem to confirm that there are 
differences due to heterogeneity of the exchange rate arrangements in the selected countries. In the case 
of pegged exchange rate regime, the value of the slope may be due to some lack of capital mobility or 
because monetary authorities actions are not consonant with the announced de jure exchange rate 
regimes. The former argument could be valid for the results on floating exchange regime sample, as well. 
 
Table 1. Estimation  results on the entire sample and the exchange rate regime subsamples  IMF de jure classification 
Dependent variable: Local money market interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Peg Intermediate Floating 
InterestEuro 0,638*** 0,405** 0,683*** 1,173*** 
 (0,0897) (0,204) (0,191) (0,149) 
InflationDif 0,137*** 0,182*** 0,346** -0,0105 
 (0,0475) (0,0630) (0,144) (0,173) 
Observations 593 198 264 131 
Adjusted R2 0,204 0,249 0,165 0,495 
Test slope=1 (p-value) 0,0001 0,0035 0,0974 0,2450 
Newey  West HAC robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
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Table 2 shows the results for the subsamples of EU member countries and non EU member countries. 
All results are statistically different from zero. We can observe that in the case of non EU member 
countries, the transmission is much more evident than in EU member countries, but the slope estimates 
are statistically different from unity for both. If we consider the subsamples grouped by countries and 
exchange rate regimes we have the following results: in the case of EU countries pegged > floating > 
intermediate, all slopes being statistically different from one; in the case of non EU member countries floating 
intermediate > pegged, the conventional wisdom about the estimated values of  is not being confirmed. 
More than that, the slope estimation for non EU countries is negative and statistically greater than one, 
showing an inverse correlation between the euro and the domestic interest rates. There are interesting 
results for non EU countries intermediate regime, as well, suggesting a full transmission of euro interest 
rates, the slope being virtually equal to one, and for non EU countries floating regime, where we can find 
an over adjustment of the domestic interest rates, because the slope estimates are statistically different and 
greater than one. According to Frankel et al (2004) this may be due to the fact that domestic monetary 
authorities follow the same monetary rules and/or share a high degree of business cycles synchronization 
over the sample period and/or because of the financial crises effect.   
 
Table 2. Estimation  results on EU and  non - EU over the exchange rate regime subsamples  IMF de jure classification 
Dependent variable: Local money market interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 EU NonEU EUPeg EUInterm EUFloat NonEUPeg NonEUInterm NonEUFloat 
InterestEuro 0,579*** 0,705*** 0,654*** 0,502** 0,634*** -1,849** 0,892*** 2,530*** 
 (0,0816) (0,166) (0,193) (0,210) (0,0520) (0,821) (0,309) (0,238) 
InflationDif 0,139*** 0,151 0,108* 0,509* -0,00511 0,264*** 0,268 0,671** 
 (0,0379) (0,117) (0,0639) (0,283) (0,0443) (0,0730) (0,178) (0,332) 
Observations 332 261 148 97 87 50 167 44 
Adjusted R2 0,320 0,138 0,340 0,035 0,659 0,186 0,204 0,809 
Test slope=1 
(p-value) 
0,0000 0,0761 0,0724 0,0175 0,0000 0,0005 0,7258 0,0000 
Newey  West HAC robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
 
We next perform a robustness checks on these results, adopting the alternative (de facto) exchange rate 
regime classification proposed by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). According to this classification, 
there is no de facto floating exchange rate regime in the sample period. This could explain the distorted 
results from the previous estimations. If we consider the estimation regime subsamples, the conventional 
wisdom is confirmed: the point estimate of the slope value is higher under pegged regimes (0.833) than 
under intermediate regimes (0.569), and almost equal to one.  
 
Table 3. Estimation  results on the entire sample and the exchange rate regime subsamples  de facto classification 
Dependent variable: Local money market interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Peg Intermediate 
InterestEuro 0,638*** 0,833*** 0,569*** 
 (0,0897) (0,225) (0,0970) 
InflationDif 0,137*** 0,0551 0,127 
 (0,0475) (0,0888) (0,0780) 
Observations 593 130 459 
Adjusted R2 0,204 0,482 0,117 
Test slope=1 (p-value) 0,0001 0,4579 0,0000 
Newey  West HAC robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
 
By splitting the sample in EU member countries and non EU member countries, we obtain the same 
results as with IMF de jure exchange rate regimes: all results are statistically different from zero and in 
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case of non EU member countries the transmission is much more evident than in EU member countries, 
but for both the slope estimates are statistically different from unity. Considering the subsamples grouped 
by countries and exchange rate regime we find that the conventional wisdom is confirmed in the case of 
EU member countries : pegged floating and pegged statistically almost equal to one. The slope value 
estimations for non EU member countries with pegged regimes are not statistically significant, but 
however there are not sufficient observations to validate the results. 
 
Table 4. Estimation  results on EU and  non - EU over the exchange rate regime subsamples  de facto classification 
Dependent variable: Local money market interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EU NonEU EuPeg EuInterm NonEuPeg NonEuInterm 
InterestEuro 0,579*** 0,705*** 0,954*** 0,488*** 0,142 0,617*** 
 (0,0816) (0,166) (0,273) (0,0929) (0,830) (0,171) 
InflationDif 0,139*** 0,151 -0,00662 0,0352 0,219*** 0,191 
 (0,0379) (0,117) (0,117) (0,0891) (0,0604) (0,128) 
Observations 332 261 108 224 22 235 
Adjusted R2 0,320 0,138 0,490 0,111 0,437 0,126 
Test slope=1 (p-value) 0,0000 0,0761 0,8668 0,0000 0,3011 0,0253 
Newey  West HAC robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
6. Conclusion 
In this research we analyze which are the consequences of the euro interest rate movements over the 
money market interest rates in selected CEE countries during the current financial crises. We find that the 
sample countries do not develop an independent monetary policy in relation with ECB on the long run, 
but the results seem to confirm that there are differences on groups of countries (EU and non EU 
members) and due to heterogeneity of their exchange rate arrangements. In the non-EU member countries 
case, the interest rates are more sensitive to euro interest rates than in EU member countries. There are 
also significant differences between the official declared exchange rate regimes (de jure) and the real 
behavior of the monetary authority (de facto). This kind of differences were confirmed before by an 
extensive literature on the link between the regime classification and various macroeconomic variables. 
The de facto classification seams to deliver results for the EU countries that are consistent to the 
conventional wisdom. For the non-EU countries there is a single valid result for the de facto arrangements  
- intermediate. However, the sensitivity of domestic interest rates of CEE countries to euro interest rates 
demonstrates a possible regional vulnerability. This could be a lesson for international banks with great 
exposure on CEE markets. In the case of financial turbulences in euro zone, the CEE countries could be 
significantly affected. It is advisable to readjust international bank positions and to reorient to other 
international markets, where the current financial crises was less present, as some Spanish banks did 
through expanding their activity in Latin America. We also recommend that international banks involved 
on CEE markets should rather be concerned of maintaining their solvability, than maintaining or 
increasing market shares. an an 
(McCauley et al, 2002), obtaining resources on local markets. 
ECB should be aware of its monetary policy decisions implication on the region. Supervision and 
regulation authority should also be more concern  subsidiaries, especially those 
with large exposure on their markets. 
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